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PERSONAL TORTS
by
Frank L. Branson*

I.

NEGLIGENCE

URING the Survey period major developments in Texas's negligence law took place in the areas of dram-shop liability, premises
liability, contributory negligence, parental and interspousal immunity, and the law under the Tort Claims Act.
A. Dram-Shop and Related Liability
One of the most surprising developments in Texas law during the Survey
period was the imposition of dram-shop liability on restaurant and tavern
2
owners. ' In two cases, Poole v. El Chico Corp. and Evans v. Joleemo, Inc., 3
appellate courts found that tavern owners owed a duty to the motoring public not to sell liquor to an intoxicated person. The Texas Supreme Court
found no reversible error in denying a writ in the Poole case.
Saenz, the defendant in Poole, arrived at the El Chico Restaurant during a
happy hour when drinks were priced two-for-one. Saenz left the El Chico
about three hours later, drove through a red light, and struck the plaintiff's
auto, killing the driver. The police arrested Saenz for driving while intoxicated, and a breathalyzer test resulted in a reading of .18, well above the
point at which a driver is presumed intoxicated. 4 Saenz pleaded guilty to
involuntary manslaughter. The plaintiffs sued Saenz and El Chico; the trial
court severed the El Chico action and entered summary judgment for El
5
Chico.
The plaintiffs argued that El Chico employees violated section 101.63(a) of
the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code, 6 and that the violation constituted neg* B.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., L.L.M., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P.C., Dallas, Texas. The author acknowledges the assistance of Jerry White, a third-year law student at the University of Texas, and
Mike Windsor, a third-year law student at Southern Methodist University, in the preparation

of certain sections of this article.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY" 444 (5th ed. 1979) defines a dram-shop as "A drinking
establishment where liquors are sold to be drunk on the premises; a bar or saloon."
2. 713 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
3. 714 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
4. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-I (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides that a driver
is presumed intoxicated when he exhibits a .10 percent blood, breath, or urine alcohol
concentration.
5. 713 S.W.2d at 957.
6. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 101.63(a) (Vernon 1978) provides: "A person com-

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 41

ligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. The court refused to address the question of negligence per se. 7 The court held, however, that "a
bar operator owes a duty to the motoring public to not knowingly sell an
alcoholic beverage to an already intoxicated person.", The court further
held that the jury should decide whether El Chico breached the duty.9
The appellate court noted that section 101.63(a) does not provide plaintiffs
in a civil suit with a statutory cause of action.' 0 The court stated, however,
that criminal statutes may provide standards for determining tort liability, "
and noted that a duty of care may be found in a legislative enactment that
does not provide for civil liability.' 2 The court in Poole relied on the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.' 3 in
which the court found that a city ordinance, requiring that doors and windows on a vacant structure be securely closed, imposed a duty on the apartment manager to protect a minor child raped in a vacant apartment.' 4 In
Nixon the court found that the purpose of the ordinance was to deter criminal activity and protect the general public.' 5 The court reasoned, therefore,
that the apartment manager owed a duty to the general public.' 6 In Poole
the appellate court found that the purpose of the Alcoholic Beverage Code is
to prevent injury to the public.' 7 Section 101.63(a), like the ordinance in
8
Nixon, gave rise to a duty owed to members of the general public.'
In Evans v. Joleemo 19 the plaintiffs sued an intoxicated driver and a tavern
owner after the driver collided with the plaintiffs' son's motorcycle, killing
the son. Plaintiffs sought to show that (1) the tavern served alcoholic drinks
to the driver when he was intoxicated, (2) the tavern's agents knew or should
have known of the driver's intoxication, and (3) the tavern's agents knew or
should have known the driver would drive away from the premises in his
auto. The plaintiffs alleged that the tavern owner was negligent in failing to
provide transportation for an intoxicated driver, or, in the alternative, in
failing to alert police that the patron left in an intoxicated state. The trial
mits an offense if he knowingly sells an alcoholic beverage to an habitual drunkard or an
intoxicated or insane person."
7. 713 S.W.2d at 957.
8. Id. at 958.

9. Id.
10. Id. at 957.
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 164, 486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623,

631 (1971)).
13. 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985). For a discussion of the Nixon decision see Branson,
Personal Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 99, 99-102 (1985).
14. 690 S.W.2d at 549.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 713 S.W.2d at 957. TEx. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 1.03 (Vernon 1978) provides,

"This code is an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the welfare,
health, peace, temperance, and safety of the people of the state."

18. 713 S.W.2d at 957-58. The court noted: "As a member of the motoring public, Larry
Poole was of the class of persons intended to be protected by section 101.63(a) and someone to
whom El Chico owed a duty to not knowingly sell an acoholic beverage to an intoxicated Rene
Saenz." Id.
19. 714 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
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court severed and dismissed the action against the tavern owner. 20
The appellate court noted the general common law rule that selling liquor
to an ordinary, able-bodied person is not a tort.2 1 The court said, however,
that the rule does not apply when the seller knows that the purchaser is
intoxicated and impaired in his ability to conform to ordinary, rational conduct. 22 The court held that at common law a tavern owner who encourages
and serves persons he knows or should know are intoxicated, and who
knows or should know the drinker will drive a motor vehicle, owes a duty to
third persons to take reasonable precautions to prevent the intoxicated person from driving. 23 The court noted that a breach of the duty could
foreseeably cause injury to third persons. 24 As in the Poole case, the court in
Evans refused to decide whether a violation of section 101.63(a) constituted
25
negligence per se.
In a lengthy dissent Chief Justice Nye attacked the court's imposition of
dram-shop liability in Evans.26 Justice Nye argued that at common law a
tavern owner is not liable for off-premises injuries sustained by third persons
as a result of an intoxicated person's acts, even when the tavern owner's
negligence in serving the patron contributed to the injury. 27 Justice Nye
observed that the Texas rule concerning dram-shop liability was not one of
immunity, but was instead one of nonliability based on the concepts of causation and foreseeability. 28 Absent a legislative act, the dissent stated, an
intermediate appellate court cannot alter the common law. 29 The dissent
20. 714 S.W.2d at 395.
21. Id. at 396.
22. Id. The court relied on McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (1883). In McCue defendants
induced a habitual drunkard to drink three pints of whiskey, causing his death. The supreme
court noted that a party can recover no damages for an injury to which he consented. Id. at
168. The court held, however, that when intoxication impairs one's ability to refuse, liability
could not be excused on the ground of consent. Id. at 169. The court ultimately held that
persons who take advantage of a drunk's mental condition are liable for damages. Id. at 171.
23. 714 S.W.2d at 396.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 397. The court stated, "While it is not necessary to decide if the statute establishes negligence per se, we believe that the legislature, in adopting ... § 101.63(a), intended
to protect the public as well as intoxicated persons." Id.
26. Id. at 397-401.
27. Id. at 397 (citing Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1971)).
28. Id. at 398. The dissent stated:
In Texas, the common law rule concerning dramshop liability was not a rule
of immunity. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine why, of all occupations, those
who furnish liquor would be singled out for a judicially conferred blessing of
immunity to respond in damages for their wrongful acts. The common law rule
in Texas is one of non-liability, founded upon concepts of causation and foreseeability. I would acknowledge the logical syllogism that one cannot become intoxicated by drinking liquor unless someone furnishes it. However, the converse
is equally logical: one cannot become intoxicated if one does not drink. Common sense dictates that both the furnishing and the drinking are part of the
chain of cause and effect that produces accidents such as the one in this case.

Id.

29. Id. at 397. The dissent noted, "[t]he function of the intermediate court of appeals is
primarily a stare decisis court. Inventiveness belongs to the legislature and, in some cases, the
Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals, but not to the intermediate appellate courts."
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asserted further that the legislature has rejected dram-shop liability, 30 and
that courts should not create liability when the legislature has not done so. 31
The dissent did not address the assertion in Poole that courts should not be
bound by legislative inaction in the area of tort law, an area in which development has come primarily32 through the judicial process as prompted by
changing social conditions.
Pinkham v. Apple Computer, Inc. 33 limited the scope of dram-shop liability. In Pinkham a temporary employee attended a company-sponsored,
weekend picnic in the company parking lot. The temporary employee, Denney, drank throughout the day and smoked marijuana off-premises. Several
employees believed that Denney was intoxicated. As Denney was leaving,
another employee told Denney that a wallet and sunglasses were on top of
Denney's car, and asked if Denney was all right. Denney replied affirmatively. Subsequently, Denney drove his vehicle into a bicycle, killing the
plaintiffs' son and injuring another youth. The trial court granted Apple
34
Computer a summary judgment.
The plaintiffs in Pinkham relied on the supreme court's holding in Otis
Engineering Corp. v. Clark.35 The Otis court held an employer liable for
injuries when an intoxicated employee killed a third party in an auto accident because the employer took affirmative action in helping the incapacitated employee to his car, possibly breaching the duty a reasonable, prudent
employer owes the public. 36 The court in Pinkham found the crucial question in Otis to be whether the employer took affirmative action to control the
employee. 37 The court found that Apple's supervisory personnel took no
action to control the temporary employee. 38 The court noted that the one
supervisory employee's conversation with Denney, advising him that his
glasses and wallet were on top of the car, was the nearest Apple came to
taking control over Denney's actions. 39 The only Apple supervisory em4°
ployee who testified stated he had no knowledge of Denney's intoxication.
The court noted that the picnic was a company function and that the comId.
30. Id. at 398. Chief Justice Nye asserted, without citation, that bills creating dram-shop
liability had been introduced in the legislature three times within the last decade. Id.
31. Id. at 399.
32. 713 S.W.2d at 958 (citing Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983);
Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983)).
33. 699 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e).
34. Id. at 388.
35. 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
36. Id. at 311. The court related the standard of care:
Therefore, the standard of duty that we now adopt for this and all other cases
currently in the judicial process, is: when, because of an employee's incapacity,
an employer exercises control over the employee, the employer has a duty to
take such action as a reasonably prudent employer under the same or similar
circumstances would take to prevent the employee from causing an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
Id.
37. 699 S.W.2d at 390.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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pany intended to benefit from the picnic through better employee morale
and employee-employer relations. 4 ' The court held, however, that these
facts, absent some measure of employer control, would not support imposing
42
liability on Apple.
In two related cases the appellate courts considered evidence of intoxication in negligence actions. In Missouri-Kansas-TexasRailroad v. Alvarez4 3
the court held that intoxication, in and of itself, does not constitute negligence. 44 The trier of fact, however, may consider evidence of intoxication in
determining whether or not a person is negligent. 45 The court in Harris v.
Cantu 46 held that while intoxication is evidence of negligence, the trial court
erred by calling attention to drinking in the jury instruction. 47 The court
held, however, that the error was not reversible error.48
B. Premises Liability
A number of cases considered the Texas Supreme Court's 1985 holding in
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.49 In Nixon the owner of a vacant
apartment was held liable for the injuries to a minor after she was abducted
and raped in the apartment.5 0 The supreme court held that a city ordinance
requiring vacant buildings to be secured created a duty owed by the owner to
the general public. 51 The Nixon court held that a premises owner may be
liable for the intentional torts of another if the owner knew or should have
known that the third party might use the premises to commit a tort or
crime.52
In Allright, Inc. v. Pearson5 3 the plaintiff leased parking space in a down41. Id. The court noted that beer was only one beverage served at the family social event,
and that the amount of alcohol was not disproportionate to the amount of food provided.
42. Id. at 391. The plaintiffs also argued that the employee's intoxication resulted from
the use of the employer's chattels. Id. The court held, however, that, "Consumption of beer
furnished by an employer at an employee party does not constitute use of the employer's chattels which would subject the employer to liability for negligent use of the chattel by the employee." Id.
43. 703 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. Id. at 369.
45. Id. (citing Benoit v. Wilson, 150 Tex. 273, 239 S.W.2d 792 (1951)).
46. 697 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ granted).
47. Id. The jury was instructed, inter alia, to consider the defendant's act or omission of
"driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors." Id. at 724.
48. Id. at 725.
49. 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985); see supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
50. 690 S.W.2d at 547.
51. Id. at 549.
52. Id. at 550. The court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965), which
states:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third
person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation
might be created,and that a thirdperson might avail himself of the opportunity to
commit such a tort or crime.
(Emphasis added.)
53. 711 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
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town Houston parking garage, believing that the garage would be attended
while open. The garage manager did not tell the plaintiff that the garage
would be unattended from 5:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. The plaintiff testified that
she would not have leased the space had she known the lot would be unattended. 54 On the second night she parked in the garage she was robbed at
7:15 p.m.; no attendant was on duty. The plaintiff recovered damages for
her property, damages for pain and mental suffering, and exemplary damages. Allright appealed, contending that it had no duty to provide security
or warn that it did not provide security. The appellate court in Pearson held
that a premises owner owes a duty of reasonable care to foresee and prevent
the injury of invitees through the criminal acts of third persons. 55 The court
rejected Allright's argument that the dangerous condition was open and obvious by noting that, "Allright's duty of reasonable care to provide adequate
security for its invitees

. . .

would justify an invitee's assumption that the

garage would be a safe place to park."'56 the court noted that the fact that a
similar event had not occurred previously did not control; rather, the controlling issue was whether the garage manager could have reasonably foreseen that a crime would occur. 57 The court concluded that when evidence
leads the jury to conclude an event is foreseeable, and when the owner's
negligence proximately causes the plaintiff's injuries, an owner will be liable
58
to a third party.
The plaintiff in Ronk v. Parking Concepts of Texas, Inc.59 was assaulted in
an outdoor parking lot at 1:30 p.m. Parking Concepts manned a booth
across the street from the parking lot, but the lot had no security features.
The trial court granted Parking Concepts a summary judgment. 60 The appellate court noted the Nixon rule that criminal conduct of a third party is a
superseding cause of injury unless the premises owner could reasonably have
foreseen that his conduct would result in the commission of a crime. 6' The
appellate court held that a premises owner has a duty to protect business
invitees from crime if the owner believes from past experience that such activities are likely to occur. 62 The court ultimately held, however, that testi54. The manager told the plaintiff that the garage remained open until 8:00 p.m., but the
manager did not mention that the lot was unattended after 5:30 p.m., and no signs indicated
that fact. The plaintiff left work at 5:15 p.m. on the first night she parked in the garage, and
she noticed an attendant on duty.
55. 711 S.W.2d at 689; see also Walkoviak v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 580 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (hotel owed duty to guest robbed in
parking garage); Morris v. Barnette, 553 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (all-night washateria owed duty to customer who was raped); Eastep v. Jack-inthe-Box, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(restaurant owed duty to customer beaten on premises).
56. 711 S.W.2d at 692-93.
57. Id. at 690.
58. Id..
59. 711 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
60. Id. at 411.
61. Id. at 412 (citing Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549).
62. 711 S.W.2d at 414. The Ronk court emphasized past similar acts, while the Pearson
court held that past similar acts were not dispositive of the issue. See supra notes 53-58 and
accompanying text.
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mony of the plaintiff's co-workers that the lot was in a high crime area, 63
and police reports showing fifteen crimes near the parking lot over a twoyear period, did not raise an issue of material fact as to whether the parking
lot owner should have known that crimes were
likely. 64 The appellate court,
65
therefore, affirmed the summary judgment.
In Yarborough v. Erway 66 a patron sued a bar owner after another patron
67
stabbed him. The appellate court addressed the issue of foreseeability.
Rather than stressing the evidence of similar events in the past, 68 the Yarborough court stressed the time frame in which the crime in question was committed. 69 The court held that owners whose businesses do not attract crime
owe no duty to guard against crime unless the owners have reason to know
acts occurring or about to occur pose an imminent likelihood of harm to an
invitee. 70 The court did not focus, as had the Nixon court, on criminal conduct over a period of months, but instead focused on the events leading to
the crime at issue. 71 The court noted that the crime in Yarborough occurred
in less than two minutes, 72 and added that the bar's employees could not
have prevented the fight had they known it was imminent. 73 The court distinguished Eastep v. Jack-in-the-Box, Inc., 74 in which a two-minute argument led to an altercation injuring an invitee. 7" The Yarborough court noted
that the Jack-in-the-Box employees had ample time to warn police before the
plaintiff was injured. 76 The Yarborough court held that the evidence
did not
77
support the jury's conclusion that the fight was foreseeable.
Several cases addressed the duty a premises owner owes to an independent
63. Co-workers related the area's undesirable reputation and potentially dangerous
character.
64. Id. at 416-17. Ten of the crimes occurred in the adjacent office building where plaintiff worked, and five were committed in an adjacent parking lot.
65. Id. at 419.
66. 705 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67. Id. at 203-04.
68. See Pearson,supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text; Ronk, supra notes 59-64 and
accompanying text.
69. 705 S.W.2d at 202.
70. Id. The court cited Castillo v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 663 S.W.2d 60, 66 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (invitees attacked outside a mall; no employees witnessed
the attack).
71. 705 S.W.2d at 203.
72. The court stated, "[The fight between Erway and Henderson occurred suddenly. The
time which elapsed between their decision to go outside and the stabbing was only a matter of
seconds or one to two minutes." Id.
73. Id.
74. 546 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
75. Two minutes elapsed between the argument and the actual fight. The fight lasted
three to five minutes before the plaintiff was injured, and police arrived three to five minutes
later.
76. 705 S.W.2d at 202.
77. Id. at 204. The Yarborough decision makes no analysis of the long-term forseeability
discussed in Ronk and Pearson. However, had the courts in Ronk and Pearson focused on the
length of the commission of the crime, it is doubtful that premises owners would be liable.
Given the lack of witnesses and short duration of most crimes, one must question whether
premises owners would be liable under Yarborough even in the most egregious circumstances.
For instance, in Nixon the supreme court lists examples of violence at the apartments and of
vagrants in the area. 690 S.W.2d at 550-51. Since the only witness in Nixon was the minor
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contractor. In Shell Oil Co. v. Songer 78 an employee of an independent contractor was electrocuted while repairing lightning damage to power lines at a
Shell facility. The employee alleged that Shell was negligent in failing to
deactivate the high voltage lines under repair. 79 The appellate court recognized the general rule that an owner owes an independent contractor a duty
of ordinary care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.80
The court held, however, that an owner need not anticipate the methods by
which a contractor performs his task.8 ' An owner would expect an electrician to appreciate the dangers associated with live wires, and the owner need
not anticipate a contractor's failure to furnish its employees with safety
equipment and appropriate warnings.8 2 The court did not address the issue
of hidden dangers, limiting its opinion to dangers known to a contractor
83
with specialized knowledge.
In Moore v. Noble Drilling Co. 84 an employee of an independent contractor who provided housekeeping services to offshore drilling rigs fell from a
table while making a top bunk bed and injured himself. 85 The district court
held that an owner's duty to keep his premises reasonably safe does not require the owner to furnish the independent contractor with the equipment to
perform a task. 86 The court further held that Noble Drilling was not required to furnish the plaintiff with an alternative means of completing his
task. 87 The task was not inherently dangerous, and any danger was open
and obvious to the plaintiff.8 8 The district court also noted that an owner
might be liable for conditions prior to work, but not for conditions the con9
tractor created.8
victim, apartment employees would not be forewarned of imminent danger to third-person.

Thus, the owner in Nixon might not be liable under the short-sighted Yarborough test.
78. 710 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
79. The jury found Shell and the plaintiff each 50% negligent. Id.
80. Id. at 620 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965)). The court
noted:
This section of the Restatement of Torts provides that a possessor of land is
subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the
land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise or reasonable care would
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk
of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or
realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to
exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
710 S.W.2d at 620.
81. 710 S.W.2d at 620.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 621.
84. 637 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
85. The plaintiff's height required him to stand on top of chairs and tables to make the
top bunks. The plaintiff's injury occurred while he attempted to step from a table top to a
chair. The district court found that the plaintiff could have used safe alternative means to
reach the bunks, and that the plaintiff could have used proper care in stepping from the table.
Id. at 100.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. The court noted that an open and obvious condition is not characterized as a
latent defect. Id.
89. Id.

1987]

PERSONAL TORTS

Although a premises owner need not furnish tools to an independent contractor, the Fifth Circuit held in Richendollar v. Diamond M Drilling Co.9o
that an owner who furnishes equipment must furnish safe equipment. 91 In
Richendollar a contractor's employee was injured when the bottom broke
from a basket in which the employee, the plaintiff, stood. 9 2 The plaintiff
brought suit under the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 9 3 and the court awarded compensation. 94 The court found the
basket negligently built, 95 but evidence conflicted as to the ownership of the
basket. 96 The Fifth Circuit held that if Diamond M, the rig owner, provided
the plaintiff with the basket or allowed him to rummage around to find the
basket, it failed to provide him with a safe workplace. 97 The court noted in
dictum that if the basket belonged to the contractor, it did not benefit the
contractor but related solely to Diamond M's interest in preparing the rig. 98
Thus, the court reasoned, Diamond M would be liable in any event for providing the plaintiff with a workplace presenting a latent defect. 99 The Fifth
Circuit granted rehearing en banc for this case. 10
In Harrod v. Grider 101 the court addressed a premises owner's duty to
oversee children on her property. In Harrod Saccomen, age twenty, accidently shot Harrod, age twelve, while Saccomen and two boys were "goofing around."10 2 Harrod's parents sued the owner of the premises, Grider,
for allowing various negligent acts on the premises. The court approved
Grider's motion for summary judgment. 103 On appeal Harrod argued that a
premises owner injuring an invitee through active negligence falls under an
exception to the general rule that a host owes only the duty not to injure his
guests by willful, wanton, or gross negligence.' 4 The appellate court held
that Harrod failed to present evidence of active negligence sufficient to withstand the motion for summary judgment. 105 Harrod also argued an excep90. 784 F.2d 580 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 790 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1986).
91. 784 F.2d at 587.
92. The court found that the owner, Diamond M, exercised control over the contractor's
employees and safety practices. Id. at 586.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (amended 1984).
94. 784 F.2d at 582.
95. Id. The court noted that the basket was "faultily welded and improperly designed."
Id. The bottom of the basket was tack-welded to the underside of the frame rather than to the
top of the frame. Id. at 587. The basket was the only means by which the plaintiff could reach
his workplace. Id.
96. More than a dozen companies worked at the site and the basket did not match those
used by other employers of the independent contractor. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 790 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1986).
101. 701 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
102. Id. at 938.
103. Id.
104. The plaintiff relied on Martinez v. Martinez, 553 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1977, no writ) (licensee has right to require occupants of premises not to injure licensee
through occupier's active negligence).
105. 701 S.W.2d at 938. The court stated:
The acts of negligence alleged against Mrs. Grider were: (1) in failing to
properly supervise the playing of or activities of the children; (2) in allowing Bill

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 41

tion to the general rule that would require a person controlling children to
meet a standard of care that a reasonable parent would exercise, and not the
standard of care an owner owes a social invitee.10 6 In rejecting the exception, the court noted that no other Texas court has recognized such an
10 7
exception.
C. Contributory Negligence
In Mayo v. Tri-Bell Industries,Inc. 108 two trucks collided on a Texas highway, killing both drivers. The widow of one driver brought a wrongful
death action against the Montana-based employer of the other driver. The
jury found the plaintiff's husband fifty-five percent negligent and the other
driver forty-five percent negligent. 9 The jury awarded the plaintiff
$300,000 pecuniary losses, $250,000 for mental anguish, and $225,000 for
loss of consortium.' 10 The trial court refused to enter judgment for the
plaintiff because of the finding that the plaintiff's husband's negligence exceeded that of the defendant's driver. 11
On appeal the plaintiff argued that nonpecuniary claims are separate from
wrongful death claims, and are not barred by the comparative negligence
statute.'1 2 The court noted that article 2212a has been construed to bar
Saccomen to play with and point the gun at Glenn Harrod; (3) in failing to give
any instructions to Bill Saccomen not to be shooting the gun toward the children and in particularly as to Glenn Harrod; (4) in failing to warn Glenn Harrod that Bill Saccomen would, in all likelihood, shoot the gun at him in playing;
(5) in allowing the gun to be accessible to be played with. The Harrods fail
under this exception because there was not any active negligence plead nor
proven in the summary judgment evidence.
Id.
106. The proposed exception is based on 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(60) (1966), which provides in part:
When a person undertakes to control and watch over a young child, even
without compensation, he becomes responsible for injury to the child through
his negligence, and his duty to use reasonable care to protect the child is not
measured by what his duty would have been to a social guest or licensee. However, the measure of duty of a person undertaking control and supervision of a
child to exercise reasonable care for the safety of the child is to be gauged by the
standard of the average reasonable parent; such person is not an insurer of the
safety of the child and has no duty to foresee and guard against every possible
hazard (footnotes omitted).
107. 701 S.W.2d at 939.
108. 787 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1986).
109. Id. at 1008.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Comparative Negligence Act, ch. 28, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 41, repealed by Act of
Sept. 1, 1985, ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3322. The act formerly provided:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or
party or the legal representative of any person or party to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or injury to persons or property if such negligence
is not greater than the negligence of the person ... against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributed to the person or party recovering.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (repealed 1985).

This section has been recodified and redrafted to provide:
(a) In an action to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury
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recovery by survivors in a wrongful death action when the deceased's negligence is greater than that of the alleged tortfeasor. 113 The loss of consortium
action, the court held, does not constitute a separate cause of action from the
wrongful death claim. 1 4 The court noted that in Whittlesey v. Miller" 5 the
Texas Supreme Court held that a wife's claim for loss of consortium is deriv-

16
ative of the tortfeasor's liability to her husband for his physical injuries.'

The court found the cases cited by the plaintiff to support her argument,

Graham v. Franco"
1 7 and Gulf Production Co. v. Quisenberry,118 distinguishable because the plaintiff here, as a third party, did not seek to recover for
injuries derived from the injuries of a contributorily negligent plaintiff, but
instead sought to recover for separate and distinct injuries inflicted upon her
by the tortfeasor. 1 9
In support of her argument that her mental anguish claim was separate
from her wrongful death claim the plaintiff cited the Fort Worth court of
appeals opinion in City of Denton v. Page.'20 In Page the appellate court
held that a spouse's claim for mental anguish is separate from the injured
spouse's claims.' 2 1 The Fort Worth court of appeals noted, in dictum, that
to person or property, contributory negligence does not bar recovery if the contributory negligence is not greater than the negligence of the person or persons
against whom recovery is sought.
(b) Damages allowed are diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering.
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon 1986).
113. 787 F.2d at 1009; see Velasquez v. Levingston, 598 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1980, no writ); New Terminal Warehouse Corp. v. Wilson, 589 S.W.2d 465,
470 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
114. 787 F.2d at 1010.
115. 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978).
116. Id. at 667.
117. 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972) (husband's negligence may not be imputed to bar wife's
separate property recovery).
118. 128 Tex. 347, 97 S.W.2d 166 (1936) (parent's negligence is not imputable to child so
as to bar child's recovery for personal injuries).
119. 787 F.2d at 1010. The court distinguished Graham and Gulf Production by noting:
We do not find the nonpecuniary loss remedies asserted here to constitute
separate causes of action. The first two cases cited by Mrs. Mayo, Graham and
Gulf Productionand their progeny, are distinguishable, because in each case, the
third party is seeking to recover for personal injuries that are not derived from
the injuries of the plaintiff who was contributorily negligent, but which are separate and distinct injuries inflicted directly upon the third party by the tortfeasor.
The distinction is illustrated by the recent Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 678
S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. App.-Autin 1984), aff'd, 699 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1985),
where the court reduced the recovery for the loss of society of the mother, as the
driver of the car in the collision where her children were killed, in proportion to
her contributory negligence. By contrast, the court awarded the father, whose
claim for loss of society derived from his nonnegligent children's death pursuant
to the wrongful death statute, full recovery.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
120. 683 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 701 S.W.2d
831 (Tex. 1986); see Branson, supra note 13, at 107.
121. 683 S.W.2d at 206. The court noted:
Mental anguish is an injury separate and apart from that suffered by an injured spouse. It might well be possible that the injured spouse's suit against the
tortfeasor could be barred and yet the spouse suffering mental anguish could still
recover against such tortfeasor. We find that a cause of action for mental
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an injured spouse's suit could be barred while the spouse suffering mental
anguish could recover. 122 The Fifth Circuit found the Page holding without
authority 123 and observed that the Dallas court of appeals reached the opposite conclusion in Dawson v. Garcia.124 The Fifth Circuit described the Page
holding as "a tenuous, alien graft on a sturdy framework of Texas law mandating the opposite conclusion,"'125 and found all of the plaintiff's nonpecu1 26
niary claims barred by her husband's contributory negligence.
In Phelan v. Lopez 127 the plaintiff sued to recover for injuries he suffered
in two different construction accidents. The plaintiff settled the second suit
and maintained the first suit, alleging acts of negligence by the property
owners and the building architect. The jury found the plaintiff thirty percent
negligent, the architect twenty percent negligent, and the building owners
fifty percent negligent. 128 The jury found, however, that the architect's negligence was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 129 The trial
court entered jdugment against the building owners, but reduced the plain30
tiff's award by thirty percent.'
The building owners argued on appeal that their contribution to the damage award should be in proportion to their percentage of negligence. The
building owners relied on article 2212a, section 2(b)13 ' and Haney Electric
Co. v. Hurst.1 32 The court believed the building owners' reliance on article
2212a, section 2(b) misplaced because section 2(b) deals only with contribution among defendants.' 33 The court observed that there were no defendants with which to compare negligence and held that section 2(b) did not
anguish is not derivative and any recovery will not be constricted by the injured
spouse's contributory negligence.
Id.
122. Id.
123. 787 F.2d at 1010.
124. 666 S.W.2d 254, 260 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ) (bystander's claim for mental
anguish brought by widow and children denied under art. 2212a when decedent was 75%
negligent).
125. 787 F.2d at 1011.
126. Id.
127. 701 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
128. Id. at 333.
129. Id. at 330.
130. Id.
131. Comparative Negligence Act, ch. 28, § 2(b), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 41 (repealed 1985)
provided: "In a case in which there is more than one defendant, and the claimant's negligence
does not exceed the total negligence of all defendants, contribution to the damages awarded to
the claimant shall be in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each defendant."
This section has been recodified and redrafted to provide: "If there is more than one defendant and the claimant's negligence does not exceed the total negligence of all defendants, contribution must be in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each defendant."
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.012 (Vernon 1986).
132. 624 S.W.2d 602 (Tex App.-Dallas 1981, writ dism'd). In Haney Electric two plaintiffs sued one defendant. The jury found each plaintiff 30% negligent and the defendant 40%
negligent. Rather than allow each plaintiff a 70% recovery, the appellate court ruled that the
negligence of the other plaintiff would be ignored and each plaintiff's recovery would be diminished by 30/70ths. Id. at 611-12.
133. 701 S.W.2d at 334.
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apply. 134 The court distinguished Haney Electric on the grounds that Haney
involved multiple plaintiffs and a single defendant. 13 5 The court found that
the trial court properly reduced the plaintiff's judgment against the building
1 36
owner by only thirty percent.
137
In Duncan v. Banks
a plaintiff found seventy-five percent negligent
sought to recover from a defendant found twenty-five percent negligent. The
plaintiff argued that article 2212a did not create a contributory negligence
bar, but only ameliorated the harsh common law rule that prevented recovery. 138 The court recognized the policy reasons underlying the plaintiff's
argument, but held that a plain reading of article 2212a barred a recovery
when the plaintiff's negligence exceeded the defendant's.' 39 The court further held that Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 140 abolished pure comparative
negligence in product liability cases, but did not abolish the system in nonproduct liability cases. 141
D.

Texas Tort Claims Act

In City of Denton v. Page 142 the Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and held that the city was immune from liability for injuries resulting from a fire marshal's negligent inspection. 143 In Page the plaintiff
rented a house located in front of a storage building. On three occasions
arsonists attempted to destroy the storage building. On each occasion the
city of Denton fire department extinguished the fire and the fire marshal
investigated the scene. The plaintiff's injuries occurred when a fourth fire
destroyed the building. 44 The fire marshal discovered empty and full cans
of gasoline both inside and outside the building after the fourth fire. The
plaintiff sued the premises owner and the city of Denton, alleging that the
fire marshal was negligent in not finding gasoline inside the building. 145 The
jury found the fire marshal negligent, and the appellate court upheld the
jury's verdict. 146
The plaintiff argued that the city of Denton was liable under section 3 of
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. The building owner was required to pay 70% of the judgment, rather than 50%.
137. 705 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

138. The plaintiff argued that article 2212a, § 1, which provided "[c]ontributory negligence
shall not bar recovery in an action by any person," does not act as a total bar to recovery. Id.
The plaintiff asserted that the language would not constitute a total bar unless the statute read,
"Contributory negligence shall bar recovery in an action by any person .... " Id. at 288.
139. Id.
140. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
141. 705 S.W.2d at 288.
142. 701 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1986).
143. 701 S.W.2d at 835.
144. The plaintiff went to the building to investigate a suspicious noise; the building burst
into flames as the plaintiff entered.
145. The plaintiff's theory was that the city, acting through the fire marshal, was negligent
in failing to discover and remove the gasoline, or in failing to warn the plaintiff of the building's dangerous condition.
146. 701 S.W.2d at 833-34.
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the Texas Tort Claims Act. 14 7 Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that the
dangerous condition of the real property constituted a waiver of the city of
Denton's governmental immunity. The supreme court rejected the plaintiff's argument, reasoning that section 3 of the Tort Claims Act does not
create new duties but merely waives the common law doctrine of governmental immunity in circumstances in which a private person would be liable. 148 The court cited the general rule that one assuming control over
property owes the same duty as the premises owner to keep the premises
reasonably safe for invitees, or to warn of dangerous conditions.1 49 The
court held that the city of Denton did not exercise control over the building,
and did not contract to remedy the dangerous conditions. 50 The fire marshal's inspection was not a promise to find an unsafe condition or to make
the building safe from arson.151 The supreme court held, therefore, that the
15 2
city of Denton did not waive governmental immunity.
Justice Kilgarlin, in a concurring opinion, sought to clarify the provisions
of the Tort Claims Act.' 5 3 Justice Kilgarlin noted that the Tort Claims Act
imposes liability on governmental entities in situations in which a private
person would be liable. 15 4 Justice Kilgarlin observed, however, that the majority's statement that a governmental unit is liable if it "owns, occupies or
controls the premises, or creates the dangerous condition"' 5 5 should not be
construed to limit governmental liability to those situations. 5 6 In Texas,
one voluntarily undertaking an affirmative course of action for the benefit of
another must exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to the other.1 57 One
undertaking such affirmative action is liable if (1) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm, or (2) he has undertaken to perform
a duty owed by the other to a third person, or (3) the harm results from the
147. Texas Tort Claims Act, ch. 530, § 3(b), 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3084-85, repealed by

Act of Sept. 1, 1985, ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3322, provided that a government
waives immunity (1) when claims arise from the use of motor vehicles, (2) when claims arise
from some use or condition of personal property, and (3) when claims arise from some use or

condition of real property.
148. 701 S.W.2d at 834. The court noted that "[A] plaintiff relying on section 3 of the Act
must prove the existence and violation of a legal duty owed him by the defendant." Id.

149. Id. at 835. The supreme court noted:
Ordinarily a person who does not own the real property must assume control

over and responsibility for the premises before there will be liability for a dangerous condition existing on the real property. It is possession and control
which generally must be shown as a prerequisite to liability .... Additionally, a
private person who has created the dangerous condition may be liable even
though not in control of the premises at the time of injury.
Id. (citation omitted).
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. Id.
153. Id. Justice Ray joined the opinion. Id.
154. Texas Tort Claims Act, ch. 530, § 3(b), 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3084-85 (repealed
1985), provided that a governmental unit is liable for negligence "if a private person would be

liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of this state."
155. 701 S.W.2d at 836.
156. Id. Justice Kilgarlin noted that, "The duties of a private person are not so
limited."Id.

157. Id. (citing Colonial Say. Ass'n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex. 1976)).
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reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.15 8 Justice
Kilgarlin noted that a governmental unit would be liable if the plaintiff
proved any of the three elements, but found that, in the present case, the
plaintiff did not prove any of the elements.15 9
In Vela v. Cameron County' 60 the plaintiffs filed suit after the decedent
drowned seaward of the mean low tide line of a county-owned beach. ' 6' The
plaintiffs alleged that the county was negligent in failing to warn of dangerous undertows and in failing to provide lifeguards and emergency services at
the beach. The appellate court held that since the drowning occurred seaward of the mean low tide line, the injury did not occur on county property.' 62 The court further held that the county owed no duty to warn of
dangers off its premises.' 63 The court also addressed the issue of whether
64
the county waived immunity under section 3(b) of the Tort Claims Act.'
The court held that the failure to provide lifeguards or emergency services
did not constitute a use of tangible real or personal property.1 65 The court
noted that the waiver provisions of section 3 do not extend to nonuse of
66
property.
E. Parentaland InterspousalImmunity
In Sneed v. Sneed 167 a minor was injured when an airplane piloted by her
father crashed. The crash killed the child's father, mother, and brother.
The daughter, the only surviving child of her deceased parents, sued her
father's estate to recover damages for her pain and suffering and for the
158. 701 S.W.2d at 836; See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
159. 701 S.W.2d at 836. Justice Kilgarlin stated:
In this case, there is no evidence that the fire marshal's negligent inspection of
the storage building increased the risk of harm ....
Further, there is no evi-

dence in the record to show that the city undertook with [the property owner] to
perform the duty owed by [the owner] to [the plaintiff] ....

Finally, there is no evidence that [the plaintiff] relied on the fire marshal's
inspection to discover the dangerous condition of the storage building ....
Without proof of any of the three elements, the city cannot be charged with a
duty under section 324A of the Restatement.
Id.
160. 703 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
161. Id. at 723. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.001(5) (Vernon 1978) defines a public
beach as:

[A]ny beach area, whether publicly or privately owned, extending inland from
the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation bordering on the Gulf of
Mexico to which the public has acquired the right of use or easement to or over
the area by prescription, dedication, presumption, or has retained a right by
virtue of continuous right in the public since time immemorial, as recognized in
law and custom.
162. 703 S.W.2d at 723.
163. Id. The court noted: "[T]he duty of the County extends only over that area that it
controls, which is between the vegetation line and that of mean low tide.... Before a duty
may be imposed, it is generally necessary that the injury occur on the premises owned or occupied by the defendant." Id. (citation omitted).

164.
165.
166.
167.

See supra note 147.
703 S.W.2d at 724-25.
Id. at 725.
705 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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death of her brother and mother. The trial court granted summary judg168
ment for the defendant.
On appeal, the court first addressed the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity, 169 and noted that applying the doctrine in the present
case would bar the actions.170 The court noted that the supreme court limited interspousal immunity in Bounds v. Caudle.17 1 In Bounds the court
held that the doctrine of interspousal immunity would not bar a suit for
intentional torts, 172 and added that when one spouse intentionally injures
another, the public's interest in preserving marital harmony is no longer
served. 173 In Sneed the court held that when the husband and wife die in a
common disaster, the doctrine of interspousal immunity no longer serves
any purpose.' 74 The court noted that when both spouses die, the need for
marital harmony ends, and no possibility of collusion to defraud an insurance company exists. 17 5 Thus, the court in Sneed announced a common
176
disaster exception to the doctrine of interspousal immunity.
The court next addressed the issue of parental immunity. 177 The court
noted that, in Texas, parents are immune from liability only for acts of ordinary negligence arising from discharge of their parental duties. 178 The court
held that parental immunity would not bar a suit in which the parent's alleged negligence did not arise from the discharge of parental duties. 179 The
court also held that the immunity rule does not bar a child's suit for the
168. Id. at 393.
169. The Texas Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of interspousal immunity in Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (Tex. 1886). The court advanced two policy considerations to
justify the immunity rule: that the rule (1) promotes marital harmony and (2) prevents collusive claims. 705 S.W.2d at 394.
170. 705 S.W.2d at 394.
171. 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
172. Id. at 927.
173. Id.
174. 705 S.W.2d at 396.
175. Id. The court stated:
In the case before us, if the wife had survived the crash which killed her
husband, there would have been no obstacle to awarding her compensation for
her injuries. The death of the husband in the same disaster terminated the marriage relationship, and it cannot seriously be asserted that her claim against her
husband's estate should be denied in order to preserve marital harmony and
tranquility. Since the husband was killed, there is no possibility of collusion
between the widow and the decedent for the purpose of raiding an insurance
company.
Id.
176. Id.
177. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), first established the doctrine of
parental immunity.
178. 705 S.W.2d at 396; see Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971)
(doctrine of parental immunity not applicable when tort arises from business activities of a
parent). The Felderhoffdecision was reaffirmed in Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751
(Tex. 1975).
179. 705 S.W.2d at 397. The court stated:
In this case the father's conduct which resulted in the death of plaintiff's
mother and brother is not referable to his parental responsibilities to plaintiff.... The Supreme Court's concern with the result of holding parents liable
for ordinary negligence in the discharge of their parental duties is irrelevant
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wrongful death of a parent.180 The court noted that a wrongful death action

involves a child's property, and held that the immunity rule does not bar a
suit for injury to a child's property. 18 1 The court ultimately held that the
child's suits for her personal injuries and for her mother's wrongful death
were allowable, but that the child could not sue under the wrongful death
18 2
statute for her brother's death.
II.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

A. Informed Consent
During the Survey period a number of cases addressed the various appli-

cations of the locality rule. Several courts took steps to abolish further the
locality rule as it applies to a physician's duty to disclose risks to the patient.' 83 In Barclay v. Campbell 184 the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the
position taken in Peterson v. Shields, 185 and held that article 4590i186 abolishes the locality rule in informed consent cases. 187 The Barclay opinion,
however, further holds that when the Medical Disclosure Panel1 88 lists a
disclosure risk, the failure of a physician to make a disclosure creates a rewhen the conduct of the parent which is involved has no connection with the
discharge of parental duties.
Id.
180. Id; see Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Tex. 1971).
181. 705 S.W.2d at 397. The court stated:
[The parental immunity rule] is limited to cases in which the child is seeking to
recover for personal bodily injuries.... The rule has never been applied to
prevent suits by minors against their parents for negligent damage to the child's
property.... An action under the wrongful death statute is not a suit seeking
redress for bodily injury inflicted on the child by the parent. Such an action is
beyond the ambit of the immunity rule.
Id. (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 398.
183. In Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967), the supreme court held that a physician has a duty to make a reasonable disclosure of risks inherent in the diagnosis or treatment
to the patient. Id. at 301. In determining whether a physician had met that duty, the court
held, "[Tihe standard is a medical one which must be proved by expert medical evidence of
what a reasonable practitioner of the same school and the same or similar locality would have
advised a patient under similar circumstances." Id.
184. 704 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. 1986).
185. 652 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1983) (TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.02
(Vernon Supp. 1987) abolished the common law locality rule in favor of a reasonable person
rule).
186. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.02 (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides:
In a suit against a physician or health care provider involving a health care
liability claim that is based on the failure of the physician or health care provider to disclose or adequately to disclose the risks and hazards involved in the
medical care or surgical procedure rendered by the physician or health care
provider, the only theory on which recovery may be obtained is that of negligence in failing to disclose the risks or hazards that could have influence a reasonable person in making a decision to give or withhold consent.
187. 704 S.W.2d at 9.
188. Article 4590i, § 6.03 creates the Texas Medical Disclosure Panel to determine which
risks a physician or health care provider must disclose to the patient. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987). The panel has the duty of preparing lists of
risks that must be disclosed. Id. § 6.04(b).
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buttable presumption of negligence. 189 When the Panel makes no determination concerning the disclosure risks, the physician is under a duty to
disclose "otherwise imposed by law." 190 The court cited the Peterson decision in holding that a "duty otherwise imposed by law" is the duty "to disclose the risks or hazards that could have influenced a reasonable person in
making a decision to give or withhold consent." 1 9' The court added that
when no presumption is raised the plaintiff must introduce expert testimony
showing (1) that risk is inherent in the medical procedure, and (2) that the
risk is so material that it could influence a reasonable person's decision to
192
consent to the procedure.
The court in Beal v. Hamilton 193 cited Barclay in holding that the plaintiff
raised issues regarding a physician's failure to disclose the hazards inherent
in the use of a drug. 194 The court held that expert testimony that a material
risk is inherent in the use of a drug meets the requirements of Peterson and
could sustain a judgment.19 5 In Ford v. Ireland 196 the court held that when
the plaintiff meets the requirements of Peterson, summary judgment is improper. 197 The Ford action involved a physician's failure to remove a metal
splinter from the patient's eye, which resulted in the loss of the eye. Thus,
the Peterson disclosure requirements extend to hazards involving both drugs
and surgical procedures.
B.

Standard of Care

The appellate courts issued split opinions as to whether the locality rule is
required in suits against physicians for negligence. In Hickson v. Martinez 198 the plaintiff argued that the Texas Supreme Court has tacitly abandoned the locality rule by recognizing that all physicians must meet the
minimum standard of care exercised by physicians in the same or similar
circumstances. 199 The Dallas court disagreed, holding that the supreme
court has not abandoned the locality rule in suits against physicians for negligence. 200 The court further held that, since all of an expert's testimony
189. 704 S.W.2d at 9. The supreme court relied on art. 4509i, § 6.07(a), which provides
that failure to make a listed disclosure creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence against
the physician. Id.
190. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4589i, § 6.07(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987)).
191. Id. (citing Peterson, 652 S.W.2d at 931).
192. Id. at 9-10.
193. 712 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986, no writ).
194. Id. at 877. The action involved thrombophlebitis, a possible side effect of the drug
Premarin.
195. Id.
196. 699 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ).
197. Id. at 589. Price v. Hurt, 711 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ), reaches a
similar holding.
198. 707 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
199. See Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977); Webb v. Jons, 488 S.W.2d
407, 411-12 (Tex. 1972).
200. 707 S.W.2d at 925. The court noted, "[A]ll of the testimony concerning the applicable
standard of care which the defendant should have observed will be based on the standard in
the defendant's community or one similar thereto." Id. (emphasis in original). The Dallas
court recognized the locality rule although the necessity of the rule was questioned more than

1987]

PERSONAL TORTS

would be based on the standard of care in the same or a similar community,
the jury need be instructed only as to whether the defendant physician acted
as a reasonable practitioner would have acted in similar circumstances, and
the jury need not be instructed as to the locality rule.201
Less than a month later the Dallas court affirmed the Hickson holding in
Horvath v. Baylor University Medical Center.2 02 The court stated that the
plaintiff had the burden of producing probative evidence of the standard of
practice in the community where the action arose. 20 3 The court noted, however, that instances may arise in which the standard of care may be identical
nationwide. 2 4 In such circumstances, the court held, a court does not err in
instructing the jury that ordinary care means the degree of care used by a
hospital in similar circumstances in a specific locality.20 5
In Wheeler v. Aldama-Luebbert206 the court held that the standard of care
is not defined in terms of locality or same school. 20 7 The court relied on the
supreme court case of Hood v. Phillips,20 8 which made no mention of a locality rule requirement, in which the supreme court articulated the standard of
care in medical malpractice actions.2 0 9 The Wheeler court observed that the
supreme court's abandonment of the concepts of locality and same school in
defining the standard of care exemplifies a modem trend away from such
definitions. 210 The supreme court's ambiguous language in Hood has, therefore, created a difference of opinion among the appellate courts regarding a
locality requirement in the standard of care.
a decade ago in Christian v. Jeter, 445 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
[The locality rule was based] on the theory that a doctor in a small community
did not have "the same opportunity or resources for keeping abreast of his profession". The reason for the rule has now disappeared with the advent of modem transportation and communication, with no lack of opportunity to keep
abreast of methods and practices.
Id. (citing Turner v. Stoker, 289 S.W. 190, 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1926, writ ref'd)).
201. 707 S.W.2d at 925.
202. 704 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
203. Id. at 870 (citing Elizondo v. Tavarez, 596 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
204. 704 S.W.2d at 870.
205. Id. "The court instructed the jury that ordinary care means 'that degree of care which
would be used by a hospital of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances in
December 1972 in Dallas, Texas.'" Id. The plaintiff objected to the inclusion of "Dallas,
Texas" because no evidence showed that the standard of care in Dallas differed from the national one. Id. The court held that "if the standards were indeed identical nationwide, the
inclusion of 'in Dallas, Texas' was harmless because Dallas is a part of the nation." Id.
206. 707 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
207. Id. at 217.
208. 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977).
209. The supreme court characterized the standard of care by noting "A physician who
undertakes a mode or form of treatment which a reasonable and prudent member of the medical profession would undertake under the same or similar circumstances shall not be subject to
liability for harm caused thereby to the patient." Id. at 165. In Wheeler the court found that
this language represented a tacit rejection of the locality rule. 707 S.W.2d at 217. The court in
Hickson, however, held that this same language did not represent a departure from the locality
requirement. 707 S.W.2d at 925.
210. 707 S.W.2d at 217.
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In Wall v. Noble2 11 the Texarkana court addressed the type of evidence
that would establish the standard of care. 212 The plaintiff in Wall alleged
that the defendant physician negligently performed breast reduction surgery,
and introduced evidence that the defendant had a consensual sexual liaison
with the patient in the context of treatment. 21 3 The court held that the evidence of the sexual liaison was "relevant, competent and material" in determining the physician's compliance with the standard of care and in
determining the degree of negligence. 214
C. Statutes of Limitations
In Bradley v. Etessam 21 5 the Dallas court of appeals addressed the issue of
whether, under the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, 216 a
complaint alleging medical malpractice could be amended to include wrongful death 217 and survival actions. 218 The plaintiff in Bradley filed a complaint alleging malpractice within the two-year limitations period provided
under article 4590i. After his wife's death the plaintiff amended his complaint to include wrongful death and survival actions. The court rejected the
defendant's claim that the court should disallow the wrongful death and survival actions because they were not filed within the two-year period required
by article 4590i, section 10.01.219 The court instead decided that a complaint filed within the two-year period could be amended to include additional causes of action, and that such amendments would relate back under
article 5539b. 220 The language of article 4590i, section 10.01 refers only to
211. 705 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
212. Id. at 731.
213. The doctor's sexual advances were allegedly accompanied with the statement, "I am
your doctor-trust me." Id.
214. Id.
215. 703 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
216. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the
breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the
subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed ....

217. Wrongful Death Act, ch. 530, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1381-82, repealedby Act of
Sept. 1, 1985, ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3322.
218. Survival Act, ch. 239, § 1, 1927 Tex. Gen. Laws 356, repealedby Act of Sept. 1, 1985,
ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3322.
219. 703 S.W.2d at 240.
220. Id. Act of May 13, 1931, ch. 115, § 1, 1931 Tex. Gen. Laws 194, repealed by Act of
Sept. 1, 1985, ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3322, provided:
Whenever any pleading is filed by any party to a suit embracing any casue of
action, cross-action, counter-claim, or defense, and at the time of filing such
pleading such cause of action, cross-action, counter-claim, or defense is not subject to a plea of limitation, no subsequent amendment or supplement changing
any of the facts or grounds of liability or of defense shall be subject to a plea of
limitation, provided such amendment or supplement is not wholly based upon
and grows out of a new, distinct or different transaction and occurrence. Provided, however, when any such amendment or supplement is filed, if any new or
different facts are alleged, upon application of the opposite party, the court may
postpone or continue the case as justice may require.
This section has been recodified and redrafted to provide:
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the filing of the original suit and has no effect on further pleadings or proceedings. 22 1 The court further held that the term action, for purposes of
222
article 4590i, section 10.01 means suit and not cause of action.
D. Texas Tort Claims Act
In two separate opinons the Corpus Christi court of appeals addressed a
hospital's liability under the Texas Tort Claims Act 223 for the alleged nonuse
of property. The plaintiff in Seller v. Guadalupe Valley Hospital 224 alleged
that hospital employees negligently failed to review the patent's emergency
room chart upon admitting the patient to the surgical floor. The court held
that the waiver of sovereign immunity under the Tort Claims Act should be
strictly construed to extend only to uses of property, not to nonuses of property. 225 In Floyd v. Willacy County Hospital District226 the plaintiff alleged
that the hospital negligently failed to provide emergency aid to her husband,
who was suffering from a heart attack. 227 Although the plaintiff alleged a
misuse of property, the court characterized the hospital's actions as a nonuse
of property. 228 The court held that a nonuse of property does not waive
governmental immunity under the Tort Claims Act. 229 Both cases relied 230
on
the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Salcedo v. El PasoHospitalDistrict.
In Salcedo the plaintiff alleged that the defendant hospital "misused, by failIf a filed pleading relates to a cause of action, cross action, counterclaim, or
defense that is not subject to a plea of limitation when the pleading is filed, a
subsequent amendment or supplement to the pleading that changes the facts or
grounds of liability or defense is not subject to a plea of limitation unless the
amendment or supplement is wholly based on a new, distinct or different transaction or occurrence.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.068 (Vernon 1986).
221. 703 S.W.2d at 240. The court noted:
Because [the plaintiff's] action was timely filed, the limitations provision, section 10.01, has been complied with, and thus its "notwithstanding any other
law" language is irrelevant as to further pleadings and proceedings in the case.
Reliance on this exclusive, introductory language is misplaced where the conditions of the limitations provision have been satisfied.
Id.
222. Id. at 241. The court reasoned that a suit must be filed within the two-year period,
but additional causes of action may be added after the limitations period. Id.
223. Texas Tort Claims Act, ch. 530, § 3, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3084-85 (repealed 1985)
provided:
Each unit of government in the state shall be liable for money damages for
property damage or personal injuries or death when proximately caused by the
negligence or wrongful act or omission of any officer or employee acting within
the scope of his employment or office arising from ... some condition or some
use of tangible property, real or personal, under circumstances where such unit
of government, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of this state.
224. 709 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
225. Id. at 38.
226. 706 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
227. The hospital alleged that its cardiac equipment was being used to aid another patient.
228. Id. at 733.
229. Id.
230. 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983).
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ing to use" 231 certain equipment, and that doctors negligently interpreted
electrocardiogram graphs. The supreme court held that the hospital waived
liability by negligently using the electrocardiograms, but the court did not
rule on the alleged nonuse of tangible property. 232 Although the supreme
court emphasized use of property 233 it expressly noted that the Tort Claims
Act should be liberally construed.234 The Corpus Christi court's decision in
Seiler cited Salcedo, however, for the proposition that the Tort Claims Act
does not extend to nonuse of property by a government entity. 235
E. Miscellaneous
In Sullivan v. Methodist Hospitals 236 the Corpus Christi court of appeals
held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied in some medical
malpractice cases. 23 7 In Sullivan a patient and her husband sued for injuries
incurred when a sponge was left in the patient's abdomen following a caesarean section. A jury in Hidalgo County found the defendant hospital and
doctor not negligent, and the plaintiff appealed. The court held that article
4590i, section 7.01 restricts the use of res ipsa loquitur to situations in which
courts applied the doctrine to medical malpractice cases before August
1977.238 Res ipsa liquitur, the court held, has long been applied to situations
when doctors left surgical instruments or supplies inside the body of the
patient. 239 The court failed, however, to find error in the failure of the trial
judge to give special issues on res ipsa loquitur, reasoning that the judge had
no reason to submit res ipsa loquitur because the record contained "direct
evidence of the appellees' acts which were allegedly negligent. '' 240 The effect
of the court's holding is to preserve one situation in which res ipsa loquitur
241
will be applied in medical malpractice cases.
The Texas Supreme Court refused to resolve the issue of whether the dam231. Id at 31.

232. Id. at 33.
233. See id. at 34.
234. Id. at 32. The supreme court noted a number of problems in interpreting the language
of the Act, but noted that the legislature had not acted to remedy those problems. See id. at
34. Section 13 of the Act, the court noted, provided that the Act shoud be liberally construed
to achieve its purposes. Id. at 32. The recodification of the Tort Claims Act, see supra note
223, does not contain the provision of art. 6252-19(13) that the Act be liberally construed. See
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 101 (Vernon 1985).
235. 709 S.W.2d at 38.
236. 699 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 714 S.W.2d
302, 303 (Tex. 1985).
237. 699 S.W.2d at 266.
238. Id. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 7.01 (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides:

"The common-law doctrine of res ispa loquitur shall only apply to health care liability claims
against health care providers or physicians in those cases to which it has been applied by the
appellate courts of this state as of the effective date of this subchapter." The court determined
that August 29, 1977, was the effective date of § 7.01. 699 S.W.2d at 266.
239. 699 S.W.2d at 267 (citing Dobbins v. Gardner, 377 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

240. 699 S.W.2d at 267.
241. In Martin v. Petta, 694 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
the court hinted that article 4590i, § 7.01 had abolished common law res ispa loquitur in
medical malpractice cases. See Branson, supra note 13, at 113 (discussing Martin).
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ages limitations of article 4590i, section 11.02242 violate the Texas Constitu-

tion. In Baptist Hospital of Southeast Texas, Inc. v. Baber 243 the court
rendered a joint and several judgment of $1,327,000 against two defendants. 2 4 The supreme court noted that changes in the consumer price in-

dex 24 5 had raised the liability limit from $500,000 to $804,419.246 Because
the judgment did not exceed the combined statutory liability of the defendants the supreme court found that the court of appeals did not need to pass

on the constitutionality of the damage limit. 247 The supreme court therefore

refused the application for writ, finding no reversible error, but expressly
24 8
refrained from ruling on the constitutionality of the damage limitations.
In Wheat v. United States249 the district court held that the liability limitation of article 4590i would not apply to cases brought under the Federal
25
Tort Claims Act. 250 The court relied on Detar Hospital,Inc. v. Estrada 1
and the appellate court opinion in BaptistHospitalof Southeast Texas, Inc. v.
Baber 252 in support of its conclusion that Texas courts have found the liability limitation unconstitutional. 2 53 The district court noted that the Texas
Supreme Court had not ruled on the constitutionality issue,254 but observed
that the Texas court "has always endeavored to interpret the laws of Texas
to avoid inequity. ' 255 The district court speculated that the
liability limita256
tions would be held invalid by the Texas Supreme Court.
In Park North General Hospital v. Hickman 257 the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant hospital breached the duty of care owed a patient by allowing
a physician to perform an operation he was not qualified to perform. The
defendant physician performed a subcutaneous mastectomy with reconstruction on the plaintiff. The plaintiff introduced evidence showing that the hospital specifically authorized the defendant to perform plastic surgery and
that a subcutaneous mastectomy involved plastic surgery. The plaintiff also
242. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02 (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides that a
physician or health care provider's liability for damages shall not exceed $500,000. Section

11.04 provides that the liability limit will be adjusted according to changes in the consumer
price index. Id. § 11.04.
243. 714 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1986).
244. Id.
245. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.01 (Vernon Supp. 1987) defines the consumer price index as the index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States
Department of Labor.
246. 714 S.W.2d at 310.
247. Id.The defendants did not attack the joint and several aspect of the judgment.
248. Id.
249. 630 F. Supp. 699 (W.D. Tex. 1986).
250. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982).
251. 694 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, no writ); see Branson, supra note
13, at 112.
252. 672 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 714
S.W.2d 310 (1986). The supreme court had not issued its opinion in Baber when the district
court issued the Wheat opinion.
253. 630 F. Supp. at 719.
254. Id. at 720.
255. Id. (quoting Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. 1983)).
256. Id.
257. 703 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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introduced evidence that a physician on the hospital's admission committee
complained, verbally and in writing, that the defendant physician was unqualified to perform a subcutaneous mastectomy. The complaining staff
physician also suggested that the hospital investigate the defendant's practice
in Las Vegas, Nevada. Although members of the admission committee
knew the defendant practiced in that city, the committee never instituted an
investigation. The appellate court held that a hospital owes a duty to its
patients and may be liable for damages for a breach of that duty.258 The

duty owed includes the exercise of reasonable care in selecting medical personnel and in granting specialized privileges. 25 9 The duty also includes the
2
periodic monitoring of personnel, and the review of their competency. 60
The court of appeals, however, reversed the judgment of the trial court in
favor of the defendant hospital. 26 I The basis for reversal was that the plaintiff's petition did not allege any gross negligence on the part of the defendant
hospital in its care and treatment of plaintiff, and that the trial court2 62therefore erroneously submitted the issue of gross negligence to the jury.
III.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Considering the substantive impact of decisions during prior Survey periods, a relatively slight amount of activity affecting Texas's substantive law of
products liability occurred during this Survey period. A few decisions of
some importance, however, which will be mentioned herein, were written
during this Survey period.
A. Duty to Warn
In several decisions the Fifth Circuit held that the duty to warn, as defined
in Ragsdale Brothers, Inc. v. Magro,263 is to be assessed in connection with
the relative knowledge and expertise of the expected user. 264 Under the current state of the law, as expressed in Ragsdale, the expertise and knowledge
of the user are factors for consideration in deciding the adequacy of the
warning given. 265 The Fifth Circuit, in accordance with this principle, upheld an instruction to a jury that no duty to warn exists when the user possesses sufficient expertise and knowledge266to permit the user to appreciate the
dangers inherent in using the product.
258. Id. at 266 (citing Jeffcoat v. Phillips, 534 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th

Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
259. Id.
260. Id.

261. Id.
262. Id.

263. 693 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985) rev'd on other grounds, 721 S.W.2d
832, 834-35 (Tex. 1987); see Branson, supra note 13, at 117.
264. See, e.g., Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 716 (5th Cir.
1986); Middleton v. Harris Press & Shear, Inc., 796 F.2d 747, 751 (5th Cir. 1986); Reese v.
Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 793 F.2d 1416, 1420 (5th Cir. 1986).
265. See Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 716 (5th Cir. 1986).
266. See Middleton v. Harris Press & Shear, Inc., 796 F.2d 747, 751 (5th Cir. 1986).
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In Reese v. Mercury Marine Division of Brunswick Corp.2 6 7 the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the failure of an independent third party
to comply with its duty to warn would relieve a manufacturer of its own
duty to warn a user of the inherent dangerousness of a product. 268 In Reese
the defendant sought to offer evidence that the retailer who dealt with the
plaintiff failed to issue adequate warnings to the user of the boat motor in
question. 2 69 The court excluded this evidence because the evidence had no
bearing on the existence of the manufacturer's duty to warn and the failure
to comply with that duty. 270 The Fifth Circuit, in Reese, held the failure of a
third party to issue adequate warnings irrelevant with respect to the issue of
causation in a suit against a manufacturer when the manufacturer also did
27 1
not issue adequate warnings.
B.

Duties of a Retailer

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Black 272 presented an interesting twist affecting
the duties of a retailer. In Sears the product in question was a washing
machine that the store sold as a Sears Kenmore, but that Whirlpool manufactured. In this case the plaintiffs brought suit against Sears, the retailer of
the machine, for the negligent design of a switch that overheated, causing a
fire that resulted in significant damage to the plaintiff's property. The trial
court entered judgment on behalf of the plaintiffs. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that one who puts out a product, manufactured by another,
as its own product owes the same duty as a manufacturer. 273
IV.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

A major area of interest during the Survey period related to the constitutionality of limiting the recovery for gross negligence to a restricted class of
heirs of a deceased worker under the Workers' Compensation Act. 274 This
and other developments affecting recovery under the Act are discussed
below.
A.

Gross Negligence

In Edmunds v. Highrise, Inc. 275 an injured plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the provision of the Workers' Compensation Act that prohibits
recovery for the employer's gross negligence. The plaintiff claimed that the
inability to maintain an action outside the Act for the employer's gross negli267. 793 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir. 1986).
268. Id. at 1420.
269. The defendant offered testimony that the retailer was aware of his duty to instruct a

purchaser of the availability of a kill switch.
270. 793 F.2d at 1420.
271. Id.
272. 708 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
273. Id. at 928 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1974)).
274. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1987).
275. 715 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd).
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gence violated the plaintiff's equal protection rights276 and the open courts

provision of the Texas Constitution. 277 The court summarily dismissed both
contentions, 278 reasoning that action for gross negligence is preserved for the
heirs of a decedent in compliance with constitutional requirements, and that
an action afforded the heirs is not created within the Act itself.279 As to the
open courts provision, the court acknowledged that article 8306, section
3(a), the challenged section of the Act, provides that upon timely notice to
the employer, an employee may forgo his claim under the Workers' Compensation Act and pursue whatever common law or statutory claims might
exist as a result of the employer's conduct. 2 80 The court emphasized that
section 3(a) was drafted so that an injured employee might relinquish his
28 1
common law remedies for a faster, more efficient means of recovery.
In Glisson v. General Cinema Corp.282 the parents of a deceased worker
challenged article 8306, section 5 of the Workers' Compensation Act, which
limits the ability to recover under the Act, and allows an action for gross
negligence only on behalf of a surviving spouse or the children of a deceased
worker. The parents alleged that exclusion of a worker's parents from the
class of claimants entitled to bring an action for gross negligence violated the
parents' equal protection right.28 3 In applying the rational relation standard
the Dallas court noted that the class of claimants excluded was not suspect,
and the right infringed upon was not fundamental. 284 In finding the classification rationally related to a state purpose, the court suggested several plausible motives of the legislature in limiting recovery to only those beneficiaries
specified in the statute. 285 The court referred to the financial dependence of
a spouse and children, the need to control the costs of workers' compensation, and the need to prevent overburdening the judicial system, as possible
276. The plaintiff asserted that the Act violates TEX. CONST. art. I,

§

3, the Texas equal

protection clause, because § 5 of the Workers' Compensation Act allows recovery of a
worker's compensation claim and an independent action for gross negligence only when the
injury results in the death of the employee. The plaintiff alleged that the limitation denies the
equal protection rights of those employees suffering less than fatal injuries.
277. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law."
278. 715 S.W.2d at 379.
279. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 26 provides:
Every person, corporation, or company, that may commit a homicide,
through wilful act, or omission, or gross neglect, shall be responsible, in exemplary damages, to the surviving husband, widow, heirs of his or her body, or
such of them as there may be, without regard to any criminal proceeding that
may or may not be had in relation to the homicide.
280. 715 S.W.2d at 379.
281. Id. (citing Bridges v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 733 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1163 (1985)).
282. 713 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
283. Article 8306, § 5 provides: "Nothing in this law shall be taken or held to prohibit the
recovery of exemplary damages by the surviving husband, wife, heirs of his or her body, or
such of them as there may be of any deceased employs . . ." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967).
284. 713 S.W.2d at 695 (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973)).
285. Id.
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justifications for limiting gross negligence recoveries to the heirs enumerated
286
within the statute.
Another case, Davis v. SinclairRefining Co. ,287 also touched on the ability
to recover damages for an employer's gross negligence. In Davis the plaintiff
had a cause of action for negligence and gross negligence against a third
party tortfeasor as well as a workers' compensation claim. 28 8 Arco, the in-

jured worker's employer, became the successor in interest to the third party
against whom the plaintiff would have had a cause of action, Sinclair,
through subsequent corporate mergers. While the court acknowledged that
the plaintiff had a valid claim for damages outside the statute against a third
party, the issue before the court was whether the plaintiff could bring this
claim against the plaintiff's employer as a successor in interest to the third
party tortfeasor. 28 9 The court rejected this contention, and failed to follow
decisions in other states allowing actions similar to the one brought by this
plaintiff.290 In so holding the court noted the public policy behind the Act:

to provide a fast and efficient avenue of recovery for an injured employee,
and to give the worker a voluntary choice of remedies under the Act. 291 The

court concluded that had the plaintiff wished to pursue a gross negligence
action against his employer, the real party at interest, he should have aban292
doned his right to recovery against the employer under the Act.

B.

The IndustrialAccident Board.

Several recent decisions have reviewed the role of the Industrial Accident
Board (IAB) in an employee's claim for damages against his employer. One
such decision was Ryan v. Travelers Insurance Co. 293 Subsequent to an ini-

tial trial court judgment on his claim, the plaintiff went before the IAB to
recover additional medical expenses, which were related to his on-the-job
injury. 294 By definition, the plaintiff's claim was for a successive award of
the expenses under article 8307, section 5.295 The plaintiff incurred the addi286. Id.
287. 704 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
288. The plaintiff suffered severe bums while in the course and scope of his employment
due to a third party's defective design of a pipe that he was working on.
289. Id. at 414. The plaintiff contended that he had no employee-employer relationship
with Sinclair, that a successor corporation is responsible for all valid liabilities and obligations
of a merged corporation, and, therefore, that Arco should have been precluded from asserting
the exclusive remedy provision of article 8306, § 3 of the Workers' Compensation Act.
290. Id. at 414-16.
291. Id. at 415.
292. Id. at 416.
293. 715 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
294. Id. at 174.
295. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides:
After the first such final award or judgment, the Board shall have continuing
jurisdiction in the same case to render successive awards to determine the liability of the association for the cost or expense of any such items actually furnished
to and received by said employee not more than six (6) months prior to the date
of each such successive award, until the association shall have fully discharged
its obligation under this law to furnish all such medical aid, hospital services,
nursing, chiropractic services, medicines or prosthetic appliances to which said
employee may be entitled; provided, each such successive award of the Board
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tional expenses in January of 1983, filed a claim for those expenses with the
IAB in February of 1983, and the Board awarded repayment in April of
1984.296 The issue before the court was whether the IAB must act within six
months of the date the employee incurs the expenses for a successive award
297
to be valid.
In ruling on the validity of the award the court pointed to several important factors. 298 First, the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is "to
benefit and protect injured employees, and to expedite settlement of meritorious claims. ' 299 Second, while the procedures for obtaining final judgment
of a claim are not specified, the plaintiff had complied with the provisions of
the Act that set out the method for providing notice of, and actually filing, a
claim. 3 eo The court also pointed to a dispositive factor, the lack of control a
claimant has over the IAB and the amount of time the Board takes to resolve a claim. 30 1 In weighing all of these factors the court refused to accept
a literal reading of the Act, opting instead to interpret section 5 as requiring
that claims for successive awards of expenses be filed within six months of
30 2
the date on which they are incurred.
In King v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association 30 3 the Fort Worth
court of appeals reviewed the IAB's jurisdiction to hear claims or disputes
arising out of a compromise settlement approved in district court. The
worker entered into a settlement agreement providing that the employer
would meet future medical expenses. A dispute arose about the reasonableness of the expenses incurred, and the worker brought an action in the district court for breach of contract. The defendant employer alleged that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit because, under article 8307,
section 5, the IAB had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. The plaintiff
contended that jurisdiction arose not under section 5, but instead arose
4
under article 8307, section 12(b).30
shall be subject to a suit to set aside said award by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the same manner as provided in the case of other awards under this law.
296. The employee filed his claim within one month of incurring the additional expense,
but the IAB made a final ruling on his claim fifteen months later.
297. 715 S.W.2d at 174. The trial court, on request of the employer's insurer, set aside the
IAB's successive award by reading article 8307, § 5 literally to find that the IAB may only
award those expenses incurred within the six months preceding the successive award. Id.
298. Id. at 175-77.
299. Id. at 175.
300. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987)).
301. 715 S.W.2d at 176.
302. Id.
303. 716 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
304. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides:
Whenever in any compromise settlement agreement approved by the board or
in any agreed judgment approved by the court, any dispute arises concerning the
payment of medical, hospital, nursing, chiropractic or podiatry services or aids
or treatment, or for medicines or prosthetic appliances for the injured employee
as provided in Section 7, Article 8306, Revised Statutes, as amended, or as provided in such compromise settlement agreements or agreed judgments, all such
disputes concerning the payment thereof shall be first presented by any party to
the Industrial Accident Board within six months from the time such dispute has
arisen (except where "good cause" is shown for any delay) for the board's deter-
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The court held that the Act required the worker to file her claim with the
The court rejected the defendant's contention that section 12(b)
does not apply because only the employer or its insurer can file a written
refusal of payment, thereby giving rise to a dispute.3 0 6 Again, the court refused to accept a literal reading of the statute.30 7 In the court's judgment,
when such a dispute arises the Act entitles the employee, and in fact compels
the employee, to present the IAB with notice of the dispute within six
months from the time it arises, and then to proceed to final resolution of the
dispute before seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.3 08
IAB. 30 5

C. Actions Against the Compensation Carrier
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Marshall,30 9 a decision that could have
significant future ramifications, the Court of Appeals for the First District in
Houston held that an injured employee entitled to open medical claims
under a worker's compensation agreed judgment has a cause of action
against a worker's compensation carrier under the common law duty of good
faith and fair dealing and also under article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance
Code. 310 An injured employee entered into a settlement agreement providing him with open medical for treatment incurred within five years of the
date of the settlement. In a short and concise manner the court unequivocally held that in actions based upon open medical provisions of worker's
compensation settlements the claimant does have a cause of action against
the compensation carrier for failure to act in good faith and for violations of
the Insurance Code.3 1 '
V.

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL ACTIONS

A.

PrenatalInjury

Several important cases were decide during the Survey period that affect
recovery under the Texas wrongful death statute. Foremost among these
cases was Witty v. American General CapitalDistributors,Inc.31 2 In Witty
the mother of a deceased unborn child brought an action against her employer alleging that, while employed by the defendant as a receptionist, she
tripped over a utility outlet and fell with such force that her unborn fetus
was fatally injured. As the baby's surviving parent the plaintiff sought damages for her child's prenatal injuries. The plaintiff sought damages in her
individual capacity for: (1) the loss of her baby's support and companionmination. A dispute arises when a written refusal of payment has been filed
with the board.
305. 716 S.W.2d at 183.
306. Id.

307. Id.
308. Id. at 183-84.
309. 699 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ granted).

310. Id. at 901; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art 21.21 (Vernon 1985).
311. 699 S.W.2d at 901.
312. 697 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ granted (opinion
pending)).
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ship; (2) her own emotional trauma and mental anguish; and (3) the loss of
her child (e.g., property damages). 3 13 The trial court entered a take-nothing
summary judgment on behalf of the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.
On appeal the court held that the trial judge had correctly followed the
principle announced by the Texas Supreme Court in Yandell v. Delgado31 4
that a wrongful death action to recover damages for a child is not maintainable unless the child is born alive. 315 The court said that while the representative of the estate of a deceased child is generally entitled to recover
damages for the child's physical pain and suffering and other damages related to the child's death under the Texas survival statute31 6 Delgado held
that "a cause of action does exist for prenatal injuries sustained at any prenatal stage provided the child is born alive and survives. ' 317 The court in
Witty held, however, that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain a suit, in her
individual capacity, at common law and under the Texas wrongful death
statute for damages resulting from her fetus's death. 318 Those damages, the
court held, properly included damages allegedly sustained because of her
emotional distress and the loss of her baby's society and companionship. 3 19
Additionally, the plaintiff was entitled to seek damages for emotional distress based upon her contemporaneous perception of the injury allegedly inflicted by the defendant's negligence. 320 Justice Dunn, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, 321 criticized the majority's reluctance to grant a cause
322
of action to the baby.
Less than a year after the decision in Witty the Fort Worth court of appeals decided Lobdell v. Tarrant County Hospital District.323 In Lobdell the
parents appealed from the summary judgment in their medical malpractice
case arising from the intrauterine death of their child. The trial court
granted summary judgment, holding that the Texas wrongful death statute
313. The plaintiff, under Survival Act, ch. 239, § 1, 1927 Tex. Gen. Laws 356 (repealed
1985), sought damages for pain and suffering and mental anguish suffered by the fetus, and
under Wrongful Death Act, ch. 530, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1381-82 (repealed 1985),
sought loss of support, companionship, affection and comfort, and her own mental anguish
suffered as a result of the injuries to the fetus. Both statutes have been recodified at TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001 (Vernon 1986).

314. 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1971).

315. 697 S.W.2d at 639.
316. Survival Act, ch. 239, § 1, 1927 Tex. Gen. Laws 356 (repealed 1985).
317. 471 S.W.2d at 570.
318. 697 S.W.2d at 639.
319. Id.
320. The contemporaneous perception theory of recovery has been applied in a case of
prenatal injury to an unborn child. Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982).
321. 697 S.W.2d 641-47.
322. Justice Dunn stated:
It is unjust, as well as artificial and unreasonable, to condition a right of
action for prenatal injuries on whether a fatally injured child is born dead or
alive. To slavishly follow the judicially engrafted proposition that an unborn
child must be born alive, though it may die a few minutes after birth, is to give

new vigor to the revolting common law maxim that "it is more proftable for the
defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him."

Id. at 642 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 127 (4th ed. 1971)).

323. 710 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
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provides no cause of action for the intrauterine death of a fetus. 324 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that a right of recovery exists under the
wrongful death statute for negligent conduct proximately causing the intrauterine death of a viable fetus. 325 The fetus in Lobdell was a viable, fullterm fetus. The fetus's ability to survive apart from the mother was not an
issue. In holding that a viable but unborn child is a person for the purposes
of the Texas wrongful death statute the court of appeals joined the majority
326
of jurisdictions.
The court of appeals in Lobdell circumvented the holding of the Texas
Supreme Court in Delgado v. Yandell.327 In Delgado, the court of appeals
said, the supreme court held only that there may be a recovery for a prenatal
injury to a nonviable fetus, but only in the event that the fetus is born alive
and survives. 328 The court of appeals said that to the extent that the
supreme court's opinion might be interpreted to conclude that "live birth is a
requirement for a right of action for a prenatal injury to a viable fetus, such
'329
conclusion is dicta which we reject."
B. Adopted Children
In Byrnes v. Ford Moter Co. 330 the plaintiff sought to extend the application of the wrongful death and survival statutes to an adopted child. The
plaintiff sought recovery under the wrongful death and survival statutes for
the death of a "to be" or "equitably" adopted child. 331 In considering the
application of the wrongful death statute to equitably adopted children the
court noted that the class of beneficiaries entitled to recover under the statute has been strictly construed to exclude equitably adopted children. 332 Because equitable adoption does not allow a child to recover for the death of a
parent, the court held that nothing short of formal adoption under the Texas
Family Code would entitle a parent to recover for the death of an adopted
333
child.
The court, however, reached a quite different result about application of
the survival statute. 334 The defendant asserted that because formal adoption
had not been achieved, the parent was not entitled to serve as a legal representative of the child's estate. The appellate court held to the contrary, finding that this plaintiff could bring a survival action for the benefit of the estate
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. at 812.
Id.
See cases cited id. at 812-13 n.l.
See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
710 S.W.2d at 813.
Id. The supreme court's per curiam opinion in Delgado stated that "a cause of action

does exist for prenatal injuries sustained at any prenatal stage provided the child is born alive
and survives." Yandell v. Delgado, 47 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1971) (citing Delgado v. Yandell, 468 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971)).
330. 642 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
331. No Texas court had entered a final adoption decree although the decree, in all
probability, would have been entered.
332. 642 F. Supp. at 310.
333. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.04 (Vernon 1986).
334. 642 F. Supp. at 311-12.
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of the deceased child. 335 The court noted, in support of the decision, that
the parental rights of the deceased's natural parents had been terminated
prior to the time the plaintiff became a parent by equitable adoption. 336 The
court also pointed out that the estate had suffered some damage and would

be left without recourse if not represented by the plaintiff.337 The court or-

dered that any recovery from the survival action be placed in the registry of
the probate court, subject to a finding by the probate court that the plaintiff
is an heir by means of the equitable adoption. 338
C. Damages
In Yowell v. PiperAircraft Corp.339 the Texas Supreme Court removed all
doubt as to the recoverability of damages for loss of inheritance in a wrongful death action. In Yowell, a case of first impression on the issue, the
supreme court recognized that many states allow loss of inheritance as an
element of damages in wrongful death actions and that those states not allowing this element of damages refrain from doing so because of the speculative nature of the amount sought. 34° The court, however, rejected the
speculative argument because wrongful death damages are generally speculative by nature. 34 1 Following the trend set in other states, the court held
that damages for loss of inheritance are recoverable in wrongful death ac342
tions when such damages would, in reasonable probability, have occurred.
The court also held that loss of inheritance need not be specially pleaded
when the pleadings give fair notice of recovery in the form of lost pecuniary
benefits. 343 The court reasoned that disallowing the heirs' recovery of the
value that would necessarily have passed to them upon the natural death of
the deceased would allow a wrongdoer to benefit from the consequences of
his wrongful act. 344 In holding that loss of inheritance is recoverable, the

court dispensed with the double recovery argument asserted by the defendants, finding that the decedent's estate did not have a cause of action for lost
future earnings. 34 5 A literal reading of this portion of the opinion leads to
the conclusion that loss of future earnings would not be a proper element of
recovery in an action brought by the estate of the decedent under the Texas
335. Id. at 311.
336. Id.
337. Id.

338. Id.
339. 703 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1986).
340. Id. at 632.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 633. The court defined loss of inheritance as "the present value that the deceased, in reasonable probability, would have added to the estate and left at natural death to
the statutory wrongful death beneficiaries but for the wrongful act causing the premature
death." Id.
343. Id. The plaintiffs alleged lost future earnings, and estimated the decedent's life expectancy, expected increases in salary and benefits, as well as their own life expectancies.
344. Id. (citing San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Long, 87 Tex. 148, 158 27 S.W. 113, 117
(1894)).
345. 703 S.W.2d at 632. The court cited Wrongful Death Act, ch. 530, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1381-82 (repealed 1985).
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survival statute.3 46 This interpretation is clouded by the court's citation of
the wrongful death statute in support of its holding, and the court's failure to
refer to the survival statute. 347 The court thus created the impression that
its true holding is that the heirs of the estate are not, in their own right,
entitled to recover the lost future earnings of the decedent. This alternative
interpretation seems more in line with the intentions of the court in allowing
recovery for loss of inheritance under the wrongful death statute.
VI.

DAMAGES

A. Remittitur
The scope of a court's power to remit damages is an issue with significant
impact, especially in the area of personal torts. The case of Benavidez v. Isles
Construction Co. 348 addressed the remittitur issue during the Survey period.
In that case the court reviewed a remittitur by the trial court of damages a
jury awarded the plaintiff. After trial of the cause the defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which requested, in the alternative, a remittitur. The trial court ordered the remittitur of the plaintiff's
damages, but did so without conditioning the order on the overruling of a
349
motion for new trial.
On appeal the Corpus Christi court held that the action taken by the trial
court was analagous to granting a motion for judgment n.o.v. 350 Since the
trial court's reduction of damages was, in effect, a judgment n.o.v., because it
was not conditioned upon the overruling of a motion for new trial, the court
3 51
reviewed the record at trial according to the standard for judgments n.o.v.
Thus, appellant's only burden in achieving reinstatement of the jury's verdict
was to show some evidence to support the jury's finding. 352 The appellate
court found that the evidence supported the verdict and reinstated the verdict.353 The court stated that when reviewing findings of damages
for pain
354
and suffering the jury's findings should be given special weight.
The Texas Supreme Court resolved the question of what standard courts
should apply in determining the necessity of ordering remittitur. In Pope v.
Moore 355 the court required application of a factual sufficiency standard,
expressly disapproving any attempt by the remitting court to base the remit346. See 703 S.W.2d at 632.
347. Compare Wrongful Death Act, ch. 530, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1381-82 (repealed
1985) (allowing for recovery by heirs individually for their own injuries) with Survival Act, ch.
239, § 1, 1927 Tex. Gen. Laws 356 (repealed 1985) (allowing for recovery by heirs as representatives of estate for injuries to estate).
348. 716 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ granted).

349. Id. at 589.
350. Id. at 590.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. 711 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1986) (the proper standard to apply is a question of law, thereby
invoking the jurisdiction of the supreme court).
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titur on factors outside the record. 356 Pope stands for the proposition that
courts should uphold a jury's damages finding unless the award is so against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be mainfestly un-

just.3 57 In this regard, the case of Pool v. FordMotor Co. 358 will have signifi-

cant impact. Pool necessarily requires that a court ordering remittitur
specify the relevant evidence and state clearly why the finding of the jury is,
in the court's opinion, so factually insufficient or so much against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. 359 The

supreme court, in light of Pope and Pool, will have a greater policing power
to prevent courts of appeal from substituting their own judgment for that of
the jury by making baseless assertions that the evidence is factually insuffi36°
cient or against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
Another significant case dealing with the power of a court to order remittitur is Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill.36 1 Durrill involved an action under the
wrongful death and survival statutes by the parents of a nineteen-year-old
girl who received fatal injuries when the gas tank of the Ford Mustang II she
was driving ruptured, engulfing the automobile in flames. 362 At trial the
court admitted evidence that Ford knew of the defect in the fuel system, and
yet did not modify the system for financial reasons. 363 The jury returned a
sizeable verdict for the plaintiffs, the most significant element of which was
an award $100,000,000 in punitive damages in favor of the decedent's estate. 364 The trial court upheld the jury's award of actual damages, but or-

dered the plaintiffs to file an $80,000,000 remittitur of the damages
awarded. 365 On appeal the Corpus Christi court ordered the remittitur of all
elements of actual damages awarded, and ordered the further remittitur of
punitive damages. 366 In ordering remittitur of the punitive damages
awarded, the court recognized that the evidence supported findings of gross
negligence. 367 The court justified its order for the further remittitur of the
356. Id. at 624. The court specifically disapproved of Armellini Express Lines of Florida,
Inc. v. Ansley, 605 S.W.2d 297, 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd. n.r.e.)
in which the appellate court found the evidence factually sufficient to uphold the jury's award
of damages, but ordered remittitur because the amount awarded shocked the court's
conscience.
357. 711 S.W.2d at 624.
358. 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).
359. Id. at 635.
360. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 535; Pope, 711 S.W.2d at 624.
361. 714 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
362. Id. at 333.
363. The plaintiff presented evidence at trial that Ford saved more than $200 million by
not modifying the defective fuel system.
364. The jury also awarded $2.5 million in actual damages to the estate of the decedent for
physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, disfigurement, and loss of physical capacity; it
awarded $2.3 million and $2.05 million to the individual parents of the decedent for their
mental anguish, loss of society, and pecuniary loss.
365. 714 S.W.2d at 333.
366. Id. at 344-47. The recovery awarded to the estate for pecuniary damages was remitted
to $10 million, and damages for physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, disfigurement,
and loss of physical capacity were remitted to $1.7 million, while the mental anguish, loss of
society, and pecuniary damages to each parent was remitted to $300,000.
367. Id. at 346.
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punitive damages awarded by the
jury solely on the grounds that the award
368
shocked the court's conscience.
In ordering the remittitur of the plaintiffs' actual damages, the court endeavored to review the relevant evidence from which it concluded that the
evidence did not support the jury's verdict. 369 The court's opinion, when
viewed as a whole, suggests that the court again utilizes the shocking to the
conscience standard expressly disapproved of by the supreme court. 370 In
addition, the appellate court did not discuss the relevant evidence in detail,
nor did the court state clearly why it considered the evidence of the damages
factually insufficient. 37' The court, however, rendered the Durrill decision
prior to both Pool and Pope; thus, the guidelines in ordering remittitur were
not so clearly defined when the court wrote the opinion.
B.

Punitive Damages

In regard to the recovery of punitive damages the courts of appeals continue to follow the lead of the Dallas court in Anderson v. Trent3 72 by disallowing the reduction of exemplary damages by the amount of plaintiff's
contributory negligence. The prevailing policy behind these holdings is that
the public benefits from punishment of the defendant's conduct, and it would
not serve the public's best interests to diminish this punishment simply because the plaintiff might have been contributorily negligent.373 Further, that
the purpose served by awarding exemplary damages is not to compensate the
374
plaintiff is well established.
C. Prejudgment Interest
After Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc.37 5 no question exists that

prejudgment interest is proper in personal injury actions. The issue arising
most frequently concerning Cavnar has been the plaintiff's pleading requirement as to prejudgment interest. 376 The Texas state courts have held, without exception, that the plaintiff must specifically plead a request for
prejudgment interest and segregate damages into past damages and future
368. Id. at 346-47. The court, significantly, cites Armellini for the proposition that remittitur may be ordered when the award of the jury, though supported by the evidence, shocks the
conscience of the court. In Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1986), the Texas Supreme
Court unequivocally disapproved of the "shock the conscience" standard as a justification for
the remittitur of actual damages. See supra notes 355-57 and accompanying text. While the
court did not expressly find the standard inappropriate for the remittitur of punitive damages,
one might assume so because holding otherwise would allow the appellate court to go outside
the record and substitute its own judgment for that of the jury.
369. 714 S.W.2d at 344.
370. Id. at 344-46.
371. Id. at 345.
372. 685 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
373. See, e.g., Hondo's Truck Stop Cafe, Inc. v. Clemmons, 715 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1986, no writ); Olin Corp. v. Dyson, 709 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
374. See Clemmons, 716 S.W.2d at 725; Dyson, 709 S.W.2d at 253.
375. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985), cited in Branson, supra note 13, at 105.
376. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Johnson, 696 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. 1985).
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damages to recover under Cavnar.377 At least one case in federal court
378
reached a contrary result.

377. See e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d at 348.
378. See Bowers v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 800 F.2d 474, 479 (5th Cir. 1986). The
court held that while the question of entitlement is a question of state law, the notice pleading
requirements apply while in federal court. Id.

